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THE OHIO "SUNSHINE" ACT: AN APPRAISAL
by
FREDERIC WHITE*
T HE OHIO OPEN MEETINGS or "Sunshine" law has existed in its present form
since November 28, 1975 [hereinafter the "Sunshine Law" or "The
Act"].' So-called open meeting legislation is neither new or unique to Ohio.
Indeed, every state has enacted one or more open meetings laws.2 This article
will examine the Sunshine Law to determine whether it has served its purpose,
that is, making the processes of government more accessible to the citizens of
the state of Ohio, and suggest some changes to increase the effectiveness of
the legislation.
I. ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT
It has been stated succinctly that "America's heritage of English law does
not include open government." '3 Indeed, Parliament conducted its business in
both houses behind closed doors. Although the original reason for this was
said to be for the protection of the Crown from outside interference, it ap-
pears that the actual justification for Parliament's failure to provide outside
information about debates and votes was to avoid revealing such information
to its constituents."
At both the federal and state levels, closed meetings concerned with substan-
tive matters have been, more often than not, the norm:
In the United States, the House of Representatives has customarily
met in public since its inception, and the Senate since 1794; most congres-
sional work is now done in committee, however, and approximately one-
third of the committee meetings have been closed in recent years. Thirty-
*Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.A. Columbia College; J.D. Columbia
University School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Amy Blenkhorn in the
preparation of this article.
'See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page Supp. 1982).
2See generally, OPEN MEETINGS: EXCEPTIONS TO STATE LAWS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS
GENERAL. (1979) [hereinafter referred to as ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT]. In addition to this report the
ASSOCIATION also has published OPEN MEETINGS: TYPES OF BODIES COVERED, and will be publishing OPEN
MEETINGS: ACTIONS AND MEETINGS COVERED. See also, Note, Government in the Sunshine: Promise or
Placebo?, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 361, 363-64 (1971); Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the
'Right to Know, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1214-16(1962); Recchie & Chernoski, Government in the Sunshine:
Open Meeting Legislation in Ohio, 37 OHIO ST. L. J. 497 (1976).
3Note, The 'Open Door' Laws: An Appraisal of Open Meetings Legislation in Indiana, 14 VAL. U. L.
REV. 295, 297 (1980).
'CRoSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW, at 180 (1953) (citations omitted).
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four of the states have constitutional requirements that the legislature meet
in public; in the others legislative sessions are open as a matter of custom.
Apparently no state, however, has a constitutional requirement of open
meeting applicable to any governmental body other than the legislature
(emphasis added).5
One Commentator, attempting to make a case for the need for open-
meeting laws has stated:
Our society firmly believes, on the one hand, that the right to par-
ticipate in our democracy includes the right to be informed. The people
can and have no real power without factual knowledge of what their
government is doing to and for them. To be well-informed, the public
should have some access to the ongoing process of decision making; not
only to what is done, but also to why it is done and what alternatives are
considered and rejected. A truly democratic electorate vitally needs to know
this information.'
Some have argued that there is a constitutional right to access to informa-
tion about governmental procedures but this argument has been countered with
the observation that the Bill of Rights was framed not as a guarantee to access
to sources of information but rather as an attempt to deny prior restraints on
publication.
Perhaps one of the best reasons for openness in government has been ex-
pounded by the National Association of Attorneys General:
Another reason for the public policy of openness is that corruption,
conflict of interest and the influence of special interests are frustrated by
public scrutiny. Public officials are more responsive to the public will when
the considerations upon which official action is based are publicly known,
and, in turn, the possibility of citizen input at various stages of the decision-
making process will help public officials be more cognizant of, and respon-
sive to, the public will. Public understanding of the competing considera-
tions facing the governmental body on any issue may facilitate public
acceptance of often difficult and unpopular but necessary decisions. Open-
ness also facilitates better reporting by the press of the governmental pro-
cess, which, after all, is the means by which the vast majority of citizens
follow the machinations of government. Finally, proponents of these laws
hope that opening the governmental process to public scrutiny will restore
public confidence in government.'
'Note, supra note 2, at 1203-04. The Sunshine Law, incidently, does not cover gathering of the Ohio General
Assembly. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
6Wickham, Let the Sun Shine! Open Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key To Closed Doors In State A nd
Local Government. 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 480, 481 (1973).
'See Note, supra note 2, at 1203-04.
8ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
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Thus it appears that there are innumerable reasons for the establishment
of open meeting laws; whether the Sunshine Law serves to promote these reasons
is another matter.
II. HISTORY OF THE SUNSHINE LAW
The Sunshine Law was originally enacted in 1954. 9 In its initial form it
applied only to boards and commissions of state agencies and authorities.'"
It prohibited such entities from taking any formal action at executive sessions,"
provided for the taking and recording of minutes' 2 and specifically excluded
parole or pardon hearings held at penal institutions by pardon and parole com-
missions from the provisions of the Act.' 3
The first version of the Act was clearly limited in scope in that there was
neither coverage of meetings and other official gatherings of local government
units nor any provision for notice of such meetings or gatherings to interested
members of the public. Additionally, there was no provision under the terms
of the initial version of the Act for any penalties for the failure to observe it.
Clearly, no meeting is really "open" if the public does not know that it will
take place. Moreover, even if public notice is given, if it is done in such a manner
as to in effect be no notice at all, the spirit of any open meeting legislation
will be frustrated.'
4
The Sunshine Law was amended in 1955 to include within its scope boards and
commissions of local political subdivisions. 5 No notice or penalty provisions
were added, however, leaving the law with little practical effect. The third
amendment 6 to the Act came in 1961; it was merely cosmetic and provided
no substantive changes.
The year 1975 brought sweeping changes to the Sunshine Law. It was
substantially amended, even its tone was changed. For example, the original
Act, as amended, never contained a preamble. Perhaps to show that it "meant
business" the Ohio General Assembly provided in the 1975 amendment to the
Act that it was to be ". . . liberally construed to require public officials to take
official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official business only in
open meetings... " "
Besides the liberal construction provision, the most important portions of
'1954 OHIO LAWS 534 [OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page Supp. 1982)].
'Oid.
"Ild.
12Id.
131d.
1'See generally, Note, supra note 2, at 1207-08; Note, supra note 3, at 320-23.
'11955 OHIo LAWS 303 [OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page Supp. 1982)].
161961 OHIO LAWS 582 [OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page Supp. 1982)].
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(A) (Page Supp. 1982).
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the Act provide for detailed definitions of "public body" 8 and "meeting";' 9
set up a detailed notice of meeting procedure for all public bodies coming within
the purview of the Act;20 specifically set out the types of "executive sessions"
which would be excluded from the Act's coverage;2' invalidate any "formal
action of any kind" if such formal action was not adopted in any open meeting
or resulted from deliberations in a meeting that was not open to the public; 2
and provide for the removal from office of any member of any public body
who has failed to act in compliance with the Act's provisions after an injunc-
tion had been issued against such person.23
Theoretically, the Act, as amended, is much tougher than it was in its
original form. Whether, as a practical matter, the amended Act is doing the
job for which it was established must be examined.
III. COVERAGE OF THE ACT
Essential to the understanding of the application of the Sunshine Law is
the definition of "public body" which, acording to Ohio Revised Code Sec-
tion 121.22(B) (1), means "any board, commission, committee, or similar deci-
sion making body of a state agency, institution, or authority, and any legislative
authority or board, commission, committee, agency, authority, or similar deci-
sion making body of any county, township, or other political subdivision or
local public institution." "Meeting" is defined as "any prearranged discus-
sion of the public business of the public body by a majority of its members."
A close examination of these two definitions reveals some subtle yet troublesome
issues.
It is clear that any committee which has as its members a majority of the
members of the public body will have its meetings covered by the Sunshine
Law. In addition, it is also axiomatic that a meeting of a "committee of the
whole" will be included as a meeting of the public body itself. It is not obvious,
however, whether, for example, a meeting of a three member committee of
a seven person council comes within the scope of the Sunshine Law. Further-
more, if the language contained in Ohio Revised Code Section 121.22(B) (1),
"similar decision making body," relates back to the word "committee" it is
not unambiguous whether such a committee is a decision making body in a
sense that a council or board is. Moreover, the Act does not make clear what
"decision making" really means. If, for example, a committee's action stands
as final without further action by the parent body then its actions would seem
to be covered by the Sunshine Law. On the other hand, if a committee's action
I OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
2 0OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(F) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(H) (Page Supp. 1982).
23Jd.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
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must still be acted upon by a legislative body then the committee's role is only
advisory in nature and arguably should not be covered.
Ohio case law does not lend much assistance in the determination of the
Act's coverage. In Curran v. Board of Park Commissioners,25 a common pleas
court found that a county park board was a government unit and, as such,
subject to the provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 121.22. A recent court
of appeals case, County Commission of Piqua v. The Piqua Daily Call, 26 while
holding that the Sunshine Law generally applies to a charter city, also found
that the Act did not and could not amend the home rule provision of the Ohio
Constitution which alone resolves the question of the power of local self govern-
ment under a city charter; nor did it expand or limit the power of the city com-
mission under its charter. Piqua went on to hold that Ohio Revised Code Sec-
tion 121.22 could not be interpreted so as to dictate to the city charter commis-
sion or assembly when, how, where and under what circumstances either might
meet, adjourn, or hold executive meetings.27 Since Piqua is not an Ohio Supreme
Court case it is not clear what ramifications it has for the future status of the
Sunshine Act. Nonetheless, Piqua seemingly invites charter municipalities to
skirt the Sunshine Law.
Two cases, Dayton Newspapers v. City of Dayton21 and Maser v. City
of Canton, perhaps best illustrate the evolution of the courts' thinking with
regard to the issue of the coverage of the Sunshine Law. In Dayton Newspapers,
a newspaper publisher and its reporter sought a declaratory judgment and per-
manent injunction against the city of Dayton to prevent the city commission
from denying both plaintiffs access to any city commission meetings. Relief
for the plaintiff was denied by the Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery
County and plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County.
In holding for the city of Dayton, the court of appeals found that when gather-
ings of the city commissioners were held in which no business was transacted
but rather were in the nature of "conferences," such conferences did not con-
stitute "meetings" within the meaning of a Dayton City Charter provision,
a related ordinance or the Sunshine Law. This meant that both the news media
and the public could be excluded from such "gatherings." In likening these
gatherings to executive sessions the court stated:
The present issue, however, concerns gatherings of commissioners
when no business is transacted; when, rather, they confer together and
with each other; and when they collaborate in doing what may be called
2522 Ohio Misc. 197, 259 N.E.2d 757 (C.P. Lake County 1970).
264 Ohio App. 2d. 222, 412 N.E.2d 1331 (Miami County, 1979). One article suggested that there was
some doubt whether the Sunshine Laws applied to school boards. See The Ohio Open Meeting Statute
as applied to Public School Board Action: A Proposed Alternative, 3 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 176(1975). That
question seems to have been put to rest. See id. at 177 n.9, 181 nn.27-30.
"See County Comm. of Piqua v. Piqua Daily Call. 64 Ohio App. 2d at 226-27, 412 N.E.2d at 1335.
"28 Ohio App. 2d 95, 274 N.E.2d 766 (Montgomery County, 1971).
2962 Ohio App. 2d 174, 405 N.E.2d 731 (Stark County, 1978).
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their "homework." It is important that they do so freely and without
restraint. Like all who have the responsibility of making important deci-
sions, they need an opportunity to express, exchange and test ideas, to
deliberate freely, off the record, and without the restraint of outside in-
fluence. Freedom of discussion in the exchange of ideas is essential to an
undertstanding of a problem. It cannot be satisfactorily accomplished under
a spotlight or before a microphone.3"
Further, this court added that even if the entire city commission met in
the conduct of investigation, if no action was taken by the commission, neither
the Sunshine Law nor the city charter provisions pertaining to open meetings
would apply. This case was, however, decided prior to the 1975 amendments
to the Sunshine Law. This reasoning is in contradiction to that of the 1975 pro-
visions of the Sunshine Act which state that "a resolution, rule, or formal action
adopted in an open meeting that results from deliberations in a meeting not
open to the public is invalid unless the deliberations were specifically authoriz-
ed in the statute." 3 Additionally, this reasoning is in direct contradiction to
the "liberal construction" provisions of the preamble to the Act.
In contrast to the Dayton Newspapers case, Maser held that a hearing by
a three member standing committee of a fourteen member city council, pur-
suant to an ordinance authorizing the committee to conduct an investigation
and subpoena witnesses concerning the operations, efficiency and moral of the
police and fire departments, came within the provisions of the Sunshine Law. 2
According to the Maser court:
[T]he mandate to make decisions as to what to find, what to con-
clude and to what to report the whole council clearly makes this particular
police and fire committee, to the limited extent that it proceeds under a
claim of authority of the particular ordinance before us, a 'decision mak-
ing body' of a municipal incorporation and thus bound by the provisions
of R.C. § 121.22.1 3
This case should not stand for the proposition that any committee of a
decision making body will necessarily have its deliberations come within the
meaning of the Sunshine Law. It is to be noted that there was a specific man-
date in this particular case from the Canton City Council to the committee
directing the committee what to find, what to conclude and what to report to
the whole council; such actions arguably made the committee not a "decision
making" body so as to be covered by the provisions of the Act. If, however,
such a toothless committee as was embodied in Maser is covered by the Act
then the further away a committee gets from a so-called mandate of this par-
"28 Ohio App. 2d at 97, 274 N.E.2d at 768.
"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(H) (Page Supp. 1982).
"162 Ohio App. 2d at 179, 405 N.E.2d at 734.
33/d.
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ticular type the less apt such committee will come under the umbrella of the
Sunshine Law.
IV. EXEMPTIONS OF SPECIFIC ENTITIES FROM THE ACT'S COVERAGE
The Act exempts specific entities from its coverage,34 under specific cir-
cumstances allows the Ohio Development Financing Commission to close its
meetings,35 and provides for executive sessions.3 6 Exclusion of certain govern-
mental bodies from open meetings law coverage is not unusual; indeed, most
governmental bodies do so." Ohio Revised Code Section 121.22(D) excludes
from the coverage of the Act both grand juries and adult parole authorities
when their hearings are conducted at penal institutions for the sole purpose
of determining paroles or pardons. In such cases it has been determined that
secrecy is more important than informing the public. By establishing a specific
exception from the open meeting laws for grand juries and adult parole
authorities, Ohio has avoided the "except as otherwise" kinds of clauses which
in many states' open meetings laws provide continuing authority for private
meetings. With regard to such clauses, it has been stated:
The immediate effect of such a clause is to compound the problem
for any citizen who wants to know whether he is legally entitled to observe
the proceedings of a given governmental body. He must survey other
statutes, ordinances and regulations to determine the location and extent
of any pertinent exceptions.3"
By avoiding the foregoing type of language, Ohio has avoided that kind of
problem.
While its vote to accept or reject an application for mortgage insurance
must be held in an open meeting and is, therefore, governed by the Act, "in
order to protect the interest of the applicant and the possible investment of
public funds" the Ohio Development Financing Commission may by the
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(D) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(E) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G) (Page Supp. 1982).
"For a more detailed discussion of such specific exclusions, see generally, Note, supura note 2, at 1206-07;
Wickham, supra note 6, at 483-87; Note, supra note 2, at 370-71; Note, supra note 3, at 309-12.
" Wickham, supra note 6, at 484. An example of such a clause is VA. CODE § 2.1-343 (1973):
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law and except as provided in §§ 2.1-344 and 2.1-345,
all meetings shall be public meetings. Minutes shall be recorded at all public meetings. However,
minutes shall not be required to be taken at deliberations of (i) standing and other committees of
the General Assembly, (ii) legislative interim study commissions and committees, including the
Virginia Code Commission, (iii) the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council and its committees, (iv)
study committees or commissions appointed by the Governor, or (v) study commissions or study
committees appointed by the governing bodies of counties, cities and towns, except where the
membership of any such study commission or study committee includes more than one member
of a three member governing body or invludes more than two members of a governing body having
four or more members. Information as to the time and place of each meeting shall be furnished
to any citizen of this State who requests such information. Requests to be notified on a continual
basis shall be made at least once a year in writing and include name, address, zip code and organization
if any, together with an adequate supply of stamped self-addressed envelopes.
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unanimous vote of all commission members present close the meeting.39 Dur-
ing its closed meeting the Ohio Development Financing Commission may receive
from the applicant, in confidence: (1) marketing plans; (2) specific business
strategy; (3) production techniques and trade secrets; (4) financial projections;
and (5) personal financial statements of the applicant or members of his
immediate family including, but not limited to, tax records or other similar
information not open to public inspection."' This provision is somewhat similar
to the Act's executive session provision pertaining to the purchase or sale of
property for public purposes.'
There is no mention in the Act of the General Assembly under the defini-
tion of "public body.' '42 In fact, the Ohio Constitutional provision which states:
"[T]he proceedings of both Houses shall be public, except in cases which, in
the opinion of two-thirds of those present, require secrecy . . .- ,3 indicates
that the General Assembly, in effect, has constitutionally provided not only
for its own "executive sessions," but also for no standards akin to those em-
bodied under the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section 121.22(G) for deter-
mining when executive sessions should be held. Such a provision allowing a
legislature to have closed meetings where "secrecy" is required is not unusual."5
While it seems that the Sunshine Law is clear in that it explicitly excepts
from its coverage under certain circumstances grand juries, parole authorities
and the Ohio Development Financing Commission, there have been, from time
to time, questions raised about its coverage of other so-called governmental
entities. For example, since the enactment of the Sunshine Law, the Ohio
Attorney General has had to rule on whether entities such as the board of trustees
of a comprehensive mental health center, the internal security committee
established by the Industrial Commission and the Bureau of Workers' Com-
pensation and the governing board of a community improvement corporation
were "public bodies" and hence subject to the Act.
The Attorney General found the board of trustees of a comprehensive men-
tal health center did not constitute a public body for purposes of Ohio Revised
Code section 121.22.6 The Attorney General's initial problem in classifying
the board of trustees was his opinion that "it possesses certain features that
are suggestible to public and private institutions. '47 In reaching the ultimate
conclusion that Ohio Revised Code section 121.22 was not intended to cover
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(E) (Page Supp. 1982).
40Id.
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
'4O io CONST. art. II, § 13.
"4See Note, supra note 2, at 1203 n.31; Note, supra note 3, at 310 n.83.
"Id.
"11976 OHIO ATT'Y. GEN. Op. 2-209.
"1d. at 2-210.
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the board of trustees, the Attorney General concentrated on the "public officials
to take official action" language of section 121.22(A). 8 After analyzing the
question in connection with two Ohio Supreme Court cases49 he concluded that
"[a] public office must be created by law and the duties thereof defined by
law. Moreover those duties must involve some exercise of the sovereign power." 5"
The Attorney General went on to state that the position of an individual sit-
ting on the board of trustees of a comprehensive mental health center did not
qualify as a public office since such position was not created by any statute
or ordinance but was derived from the corporate articles of the institution and
that the management of the corporation did not involve any exercise of any
portion of the sovereign power in the State of Ohio.5'
In a 1978 Attorney General's opinion the finding that the Internal Security
Committee, established jointly by the Industrial Commission and the Bureau
of Workers' Compensation, was a public body within the meaning of the Act
was based, in part, on the observation by the Attorney General that the Internal
Security Committee was significantly different from the board of trustees con-
sidered in his 1976 opinion.52 Not only did the Attorney General find that the
Internal Security Committee was statutorily created by a state agency and hence
a "committee ... of a state agency," but also, that it was a "decision making
body" within the meaning of the Act.53 In this opinion the Attorney General
also reiterated the finding contained in section 121.22(A) that the Act was to
be "liberally construed." 5 The Attorney General echoed this language in a
1979 opinion that found that the governing board of a community improve-
ment corporation that had been designated as the agency of a county, a municipal
corporation, or any combination thereof, pursuant Ohio Revised Code section
1724.10, constituted a public body for purposes of the Act.55 It appears,
therefore, that the question whether an entity is covered by the Act will be
answered in the affirmative by the Attorney General if he concludes that the
entity is created by statute or ordinance and its duties involve some exercise
of the sovereign power.
"Id. at 2-211.
'State ex rel. Milburn v. Pethel, 153 Ohio St 1, 90 N.E.2d 686 (1950); Herbert v. Ferguson, 142 Ohio
St. 496, 52 N.E.2d 980 (1944).
501976 OHlo ATT'Y. GEN. Op. 2-209, 2-211.
"Id.
121978 OHIO A-r'y. GEN. O'. 2-144.
"The Attorney General distinguished the Internal Security Committee from a subordinate agency or
committee whose only function would be to make recommendations to its parent organization on the basis
that the Committee was ". . . more than an informal advisory committee. It is a statutorily created,
independent entity that performs expressly defined duties of an ongoing nature. As such, it differs
fundamentally from an informal, ad hoc committee created by and for the convenience of a parent body."
Id. at 2-146. In addition regardless of whether the Committee's decisions were termed "provisional" or
were removed from the rights of the parties involved that they were nonetheless decisions and, hence,
subject to the strictures of the Sunshine Act. Moreover, the Attorney General was further convinced that
the Committee was a decision making body because it was vested with statutory authority to exercise certain
sovereign powers.
"Id. at 2-147.
"11979 OHIo ATT'Y. GEN. Op. 2-203.
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V. NOTICE
"Declaring a meeting open to the public means little if the public is not
informed that a meeting is scheduled." 5 6 Indeed, in 1962 only six open meetings
statutes provided for public notice of meetings. 7 Since 1962, however, most
states have provided for notice provisions in their open meeting statutes.
5 8
The Sunshine Law provides, by rule, for reasonable methods whereby "any
person may determine the time and place of all regularly scheduled meetings
and the time, place, and purpose of all special meetings." 5 9 In addition, public
bodies cannot hold special meetings unless they give twenty-four hour advance
notice to the news media that have requested notification. 60 Even if there is
an emergency requiring immediate official action the public body must notify
the news media that have requested prior notification immediately of the time,
place, and purpose of the emergency meeting. 61 The Act also provides for
advance notification to those who pay a reasonable fee of all meetings at which
any specific type of public business has to be discussed.62 While the Act does
not so indicate in specific terms it would appear that since public bodies must
provide for notice by rule that those persons who wish to have notice of regular
and special meetings probably should have access to the rules, and in turn, be
able to challenge such rules if they are not in accordance with the Act itself.
Different jurisdictions have handled the notice problem in different ways.
Unlike Ohio, some state statutes provide only for notice of "regular meetings
and only to those persons who request such notice." ' 63 Ohio provides for a
"reasonable method" of giving notice but does not define what such "reasonable
method" should be. While the rule with regard to advance notification of all
meetings at which specific types of public businesses may be discussed may be
of some assistance to those who have a special interest, this rule does not assist
the person who is simply interested in government generally. Therefore, not
only is the Act remiss in not setting out an exact definition of a reasonable
method of notice, it also is inadequate in that it does not provide that, at least
as to special meetings, an agenda be provided. One commentator has stated that:
In a number of situations, notice of a meeting without some indica-
tion of the subject matter would be of little benefit to the public. Although
"Note, supra note 3, at 320. This sentiment is echoed in Note, supra note 2, at 1207-08; Note, supra note
2, at 373.
"Note, supra note 2, at 1207 n.10.
"Note, supra note 3, at 320.
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(F) (Page Supp. 1982).
"Id.
61d.
621d.
"See Note, supra note 3, at 320; Tacha, The Kansas Open Meeting Act: Sunshine on the Sunflower State?
25 U. KAN. L. REV. 169, 182 (1977). For example, the Kansas Open Meeting Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §
75-4318(b) (Supp. 1975) states: "Notice of the date, time and place of any regular meeting of any public
body designated hereinabove shall be furnished to any person requesting such information."
[Vol. 16:2
THE OHIO "SUNSHINE" ACT: AN APPRAISAL
the press might be interested in attending every meeting of a governing
body, members of the public are likely to be more selective. If a statute
is to truly serve the public needs, some notice of agenda as well as time,
place and date should be required. 64
The Ohio Municipal League, in addition to drafting a short analysis of
the Act at its inception, has also drafted a set of sample rules of notice. 65 These
rules, if they are being used, may go a long way toward eliminating some of
the vagaries created by the Ohio General Assembly in its failure to provide a
definition of a reasonable method of notice.
The potential problems surrounding the Sunshine Law have not reached
nearly the proportions predicted by public officials at its inception.66 In addi-
tion, what litigation there has been has centered around the notice provisions
embodied in Ohio Revised Code section 121.22(F). In addition, most of this
litigation has had to do with the dismissal or, rather, the failure to renew the
contracts of non-tenured teachers. Only four cases pertaining to the Sunshine
Law have been decided by the Ohio Supreme Court since the 1975 amendments.67
Only one, Electrical Protection Association v. Public Utilities Commission,"6
was directly concerned with the notice provisions of section 121.22(F). Because,
however, that case is more pertinent to the enforcement provisions problems
of Revised Code section 121.22(H) it shall be discussed under that subsection.
A recent Ohio case, Amigo v. Board of Education69 dealt directly with
section 121.22(F). In that case a local school district board of education deter-
mined at a regular meeting that the plaintiff's contract would not be renewed.
The plaintiff was not personally served with notice of this meeting by the board
of education.
Pursuant to statute the plaintiff was informed that her contract would not
be renewed. She filed a complaint in the Medina County Court of Common
Pleas alleging that the Board of Education's failure to notify her of the regular
meeting at which a determination was made that her contract would not be
renewed did not comply with the Sunshine Law and was, therefore, invalid.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant Board of Education at the
close of the plaintiff's case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to state
'Note, supra note 3, at 320.
"See OHIO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN OHIO (1980), at chapter 33, appendix A.
"For example, one local elected official stated that the Sunshine Law was " '... overly-restrictive and
endangers the validity of almost any ordinance a city could pass.' " Cleveland Press, Dec. 19, 1975, at
B 8, cols. 5 & 6. The quote is from statements made by Sheldon Burns, a City of Beachwood Councilman.
Certain Medina County elected officials stated that the law could in many cases "be interpreted to work
hardships on officials." Cleveland Press, Dec. 15, 1975, at C 4, cols. 4 & 5. There is little evidence to
indicate that either of these problems have occurred in any great numbers.
"Matheny v. Board of Education, 62 Ohio St. 2d. 362, 405 N.E.2d 1041 (1980); State ex rel. Celebrezze,
Jr. v. Court, 60 Ohio St. 2d. 188, 398 N.E.2d 777 (1979); Electrical Protection Association v. Public Utilities
Commission, 50 Ohio St. 2d. 169, 364 N.E.2d 3 (1977).
,81d.
"959 Ohio App. 2d. 231, 394 N.E.2d 331 (1978).
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a claim for which relief could be granted. Included among the trial court's
findings were: (1) the board had adopted a notice rule pursuant to the Ohio
Sunshine law; (2) the plaintiff had not requested the board to notify her of
public meetings of the board; (3) that notice of the meetings of the board were
not served upon the plaintiff since she had not requested them; and (4) that
the plaintiff received copies of a newsletter sent to all teachers in the system
which included a notice of the public meetings of the board. In affirming the
trial court the Court of Appeals indicated that section 121.22(F) provided that
personal advance notification of meetings was only to be given if a person
specifically requested such personal notice and since the plaintiff had not re-
quested such advance notification neither the Sunshine law nor the law governing
the employment of non-tenured teachers indicated that she should have been
given personal notice. The Court went on to add: "[T]he plaintiff could have,
among other things, deposited a self-addressed envelope together with a written
request to be notified of any meeting during which the renewal of her contract
would be considered with the clerk." 7 0
While the foregoing is undoubtedly true, this case points out one of the
major weaknesses of the Sunshine Law. On the one hand, Ohio Revised Code
section 121.22(C) states that a public body is to provide a reasonable method
whereby one may find the time and place of all regularly scheduled meetings.
Because, however, the statute does not provide that a public body must in-
dicate what the agenda will be at one of its open meetings, a person is put in
the unenviable position of having to attend every regular meeting of a public
body like a board of education with the idea that something might turn up
concerning them personally. Does the Court of Appeals suggestion concerning
the written request indicate that every non-tenured teacher must make such a
request at the risk of not being in a position to protest if his or her contract
is up for renewal at a meeting which they simply cannot attend? In addition,
as the plaintiff in Amigo argued unsuccessfully, can it not be stated that the
ability of a public employee to request a "public hearing under the provisions
of section 121.22(G) (1) is a worthless one if there is no corresponding provi-
sion that necessitates that a public body give notice to the public employee that
his employment situation is to be discussed at its next regular meeting? Since
the Amigo case did not reach the Ohio Supreme Court, it is perhaps safe to
assume that the Supreme Court either agrees with the reasoning of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals or simply is waiting for a better fact situa-
tion upon which to speak concerning the notice provisions of the Sunshine Law.
Furthermore, Amigo does not seem to be an anomaly; various Ohio courts
of common pleas have dealt with similar situations in which non-tenured teachers
have had their contracts not renewed and have attempted to argue that such
actions by the various boards of education involved were invalid because of
a failure to comply with the Sunshine Law. The courts have been consistent
"Ild. at 236.
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in disallowing such claims.7'
VI. EXECUTIVE SESSIONS
The Sunshine Act specifically exempts certain confidential matters from
its coverage by providing for executive or closed sessions. All states with open
meeting laws provide, in some way, for the exemption of certain confidential
matters from their coverage; all such statutes are not necessarily as specific as
Ohio's. 
The Sunshine Act provides that the members of the public body may hold
an executive session only at a regular or special meeting for the sole purpose
of considering (1) "appointment, employment, dismissal, discipline, promo-
tion, demotion, or compensation of a public employee or official, or the in-
vestigation of charges or complaints against a covered employee, official, licensee
or regulated individual";" (2) the purchase or sale of public property if premature
disclosure of information would give an unfair competitive or bargaining ad-
vantage to persons whose personal private interests is adverse to the general
public interest;74 (3) conferences with the public body's attorneys involving
disputes that may involved pending or any court action;" (4) preparing for,
conducting, or reviewing negotiations of bargaining sessions with public
employees concerning their compensation or other terms or conditions of their
employment;7" (5) matters required to be kept confidential by federal law or
rules or state statutes;" and (6) specialized details for security arrangements
where disclosure of the matter discussed might reveal information that could
be used for the purpose of committing, or avoiding prosecution for, a viola-
tion of the law.78
Like the notice provisions of the Sunshine Act most litigation concerning
the executive session portion of the Act have had to do with the dismissal or
"Rossford Association of Classroom Teachers v. Brubaker, No. WO-77-61 (Wood County, 1978); Massie
v. Warren Local Bd. of Educ. No. 488 (Washington County, 1978); Rockwell v. New Lexington City
Bd. of Educ. No. CA-293 (Perry County, 1979); Hill v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., No. 520 (Monroe
County, 1979).
7'With regard to confidential records and related matters, it has been written that "Exceptions to open
meeting laws for confidential matters generally provide that records required to be kept confidential by
federal or state law may be considered in executive sessions. Some states have explicit provisions for such
sessions while other states exempt confidential matters through statutory construction. Confidential matters
relate to a variety of subjects. They include, but are by no means limited to, such topics as: medical, health
and welfare records; the attorney-client privilege; labor negotiations; parole proceedings; licensing
examinations; and an assortment of privileged information relating to individual privacy.
While most legislatures agree that certain confidential matters should be exempted from the requirements
of open meeting laws, there is no singular interpretation to provide uniformity on the scope of such an
exception." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 72.
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(3) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(4) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(5) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(6) (Page Supp. 1982).
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nonretention of secondary school teachers. In one case, Matheny v. Frontier
Local Board of Eduation, " it was contended that section 121.22(G) (1)
... grants some form of public hearing to a nontenured teacher whose
limited contract is about to expire, when so requested by the teacher. Alter-
natively, appellant argued that, at a minimum, when sought by the teacher
this section requires that all discussion pertaining to renewal of a limited
teaching contract must take place in open session. These arguments are
not well taken."0
The Supreme Court in Matheny based its decision upon these facts: (1)
Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3319, applicable to school boards and teachers,
did not require the school board to set forth reasons supporting its decision
not to renew a limited teaching contract; (2) nowhere did Ohio Revised Code
Chapter 3319 necessitate that the board of education had to provide teachers
whose limited contracts are due to expire with the opportunity to be heard at
the meeting where his reemployment was being considered: (3) the Ohio General
Assembly in enacting section 121.22(G) (1) intended to leave undisturbed the
provisions of Revised Code Chapter 3319 relating to teacher employment and
Ohio Revised Code; and (4) Ohio Revised Code sections 3319.16 and
121.22(G) (1) both indicate that discussion matters concerning a teacher whose
contract is to be terminated are to be private unless the teacher requests a public
hearing. ,
In an earlier case decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio prior to the 1975
amendment, Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, 82 a publishing
company brought an action for declaratory judgment advising the company
and the City of Akron whether various governmental bodies of that city could
hold meetings closed to the public. The court held in aper curiam opinion that
public bodies created by an act of the General Assembly were subject to the
Sunshine Act; that boards appointed directly by the City Council without in-
volving the mayor or chief administrator would or would not come under the
purview of section 121.22 based on an examination of the act creating each
and every such agency; and that the boards and commissions created by the
executive office of the mayor and chief administrator were not subject to the
provisions of the Sunshine Act.83
"62 Ohio St. 2d 362, 405 N.E.2d 1041 (1980).
"uSee id. at 366.
'Id. at 366-68.
113 Ohio St. 2d 191, 209 N.E.2d 399 (1965).
"See id. at 196, 209 N.E.2d at 403. It is interesting to note in this case that the Supreme Court of Ohio
based a portion of its decision concerning the "sovereignty" of certain City of Akron boards and
commissions on various portions of the Akron charter. For example, on page 197 of the opinion the court
states: "The Health Commission, under the charter has full legislative power in all matters concerning
the public health and sanitation and is not controlled by ordinances passed by the City Council. The Health
Commission can provide its own rules for the conduct of its meetings." Of course, this statement was
written prior to the 1975 amendments, but certain holdings concerning the impact of the Open Meeting
Law on the conduct of the business of charter cities which were made after the 1975 amendment may
indicate that the above quote is still viable. Such holdings will be discussed in the section of this paper
concerned with charter cities.
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The most widely recognized use of the executive sessions provisions in open
meeting law is for personnel matters. According to a recent report at least 36
states offer this kind of exception and, the scope of these provisions vary greatly
from state to state.8 ' The Attorney General's Report offers two observations
on the basis of the exception for personnel matters:
The legislature's determination that an employee's interest in protecting
his or her personal privacy and reputation outweigh the public's right to
observe personnel deliberations of a governmental body. A second reason
proceeds from the belief that a government agency operates more effi-
ciently when it is committed to organize and staff itself in private. From
an administrator's perspective, it would be cumbersome and time con-
suming if every internal procedure dealing with individual employees were
required to be open to the public. Furthermore, officials might hesitate
to be publicly candid about prospective personnel or disciplinary pro-
ceedings because any criticism or charge could take on unintended per-
sonal tone and prove damaging to both the individual and the agency.
Because so many states offer the option of executive session for personnel
matters, it appears that there is a general agreement that a citizen's "need
to know" does not outweigh the protection of personal privacy and the
continuation of efficient internal management.85
Some states, such as Florida, do not contain the personnel exception in
their open meeting law. The Florida Supreme Court's disinclination to include
the exception in the Florida open meeting law statute appears to be for the reason
that the Florida law is regulatory in nature and deals with the power and discre-
tion of certain governmental agencies and as such is not necessarily concerned
with any rights or privileges of third parties dealing with such agencies. It is
also the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court that personnel matters are neither
sacred nor legally privileged, nor do they enjoy insulation from legislative
control.86 Clearly the Ohio General Assembly does not take the position on
personnel matters that the Florida court does and the Ohio position is in con-
formity with the majority of jurisdictions.
Providing for the discussion of real estate transactions in executive session
has had the effect of protecting the public interest by putting the public body
in the same position as a private party in property negotiations.8 ' The Act pro-
vides that the ". . . purchase or sale of public property is void if the seller or
buyer of the public property has received covert information from a member
that has not been disclosed to the general public in sufficient time for other
"See ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 21.
"Id.
"See generally, Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So.2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
"
TTacha, supra note 63, at 196. See also, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 125, which indicates
that over 30 states provide in their open meeting laws for executive sessions for public bodies for the discussion
of the sale or acquisition of public property.
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prospective buyers and sellers to prepare and submit offers." While it is
presumably true that this section makes a good deal of sense in regard to the
protection of the public purse, it is doubtful if there is any realistic method
to ensure that the actions that are void will not be done. This is especially crucial
since the statute provides if the minutes of the public body show that its meetings
and deliberations have been conducted in compliance with the Act that "any
instrument executed by the public body purporting to convey, lease, or other-
wise dispose of any right, title, or interest in any public property shall be con-
clusively presumed to have been executed in compliance with this section." 9
According to the Attorney General's report:
The attorney client privilege in pending litigation provides one of the most
widely recognized exceptions to open meeting laws. Approximately 27 states
have exceptions that specifically permit discussion of litigation in executive
session, and 8 states have in effect an exception for an attorney client discus-
sion. In addition, a number of states recognize the attorney client privilege,
even in the absence of an express statutory exception.9"
The Ohio Sunshine Act allowed executive session for conferences concerned
with "pending or imminent" court action. The problem with this provision,
however, is that it does not provide much of a guide for the determination of
what "imminent" means. For example, is simply the oral threat of a law suit
sufficient cause to close a meeting of a public body for the purpose of a con-
ference with an attorney? In addition, does the meeting of a governing body
and an opposing litigant in an effort to reach an out of court settlement qualify
for the use of the executive session? Some state statutes are much more specific
in delineating what kinds of attorney client conferences quality for executive
session.9" If it can be assumed that public bodies conducting collective bargaining
negotiations would be placed at a decided disadvantage if their preparation and
preliminary meetings had to be open particularly when those of their opponents
did not have to be, it is probably no surprise that the Ohio Sunshine Act pro-
vides for executive sessions for labor negotiations.92 In addition, the Act pro-
vides for executive session for confidential matters as well as "specialized details
of security arrangements for disclosure of the matters discussed might reveal
information that could be used for the purpose of committing or avoiding pro-
secution for a violation of the law." 93
VII. SANCTIONS
Ohio Revised Code section 121.22(H) provides that resolutions, rules or
"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
99d
.
9ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 92.
"See Note, supra note 3, at 314-17. See also ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 92-114.
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(4) (Page Supp. 1982). For other discussions of the use of the executive
session for labor negotiations, see ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 115-24.
"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(5) and (G)(6) (Page Supp. 1982).
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formal actions of any kind are to be invalid unless adopted in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. The appropriate court of common pleas is empowered
to issue an injunction to compel the members of the public body to comply
with the provisions of the Act upon proof of a violation or a threatened viola-
tion. In addition any member of the public body who knowingly violates such
injunction may be removed from office and action brought in the appropriate
court of common pleas for the purpose by the prosecuting attorney or the
attorney general.
The rather omnious tone of these provisions has already been severely
blunted by a fairly recent Supreme Court of Ohio decision. In Ohio Commit-
tee of the Central Station Electrical Protection Ass'n v. Public Utilities
Commission," the Supreme Court held that "without a showing of concomitant
harm or prejudice" it would not reverse an order of the Public Utilities Com-
mission on the ground of violation of the Sunshine Law. " The difficulty with
this decision is that no where in the Sunshine Act is there any language that
indicates that a person charging a violation of the Act has to show "concomit-
tant harm or prejudice." Rather, Ohio Revised Code section 121.22(H) seems
to indicate that any violation of its provisions is enough to warrant an injunc-
tion. Such reasoning is bolstered by a reading of the beginning of the statute
at section 121.22(A) which states that the Act is to be "liberally construed."
While the use of the injunction and removal from office sanctions are not
unique to Ohio, such measures are by no means the only ones used in other
states to attempt to force compliance with their respective open meeting laws. 96
Some use criminal sanctions, but there is some doubt whether criminal penalties
do any good in helping enforcing of the law. For example, at least as of 1975,
no cases have been found in any state where criminal penalties have been
imposed. 97
In addition a recent article on the effect of imposing other than the civil
sanctions provides a clear indication of why the Supreme Court of Ohio held
as it did in the Ohio Committee case:
The new methods, too, have some defects, but they are at least reasonably
related to the purpose of open meetings to the public. The problem with
invalidation is that it is available only when an illegal meeting results in
"50 Ohio St. 2d 169, 364 N.E.2d 3 (1977). See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(H) (Page Supp. 1982).
91Id. at 174, 364 N.E.2d at 6.
16For example, according to one recent article:
A variety of sanctions can be found in current open meeting laws. Most common appears to be
the minor criminal penalty with the range of maximum fines running from $25 to $500, and a $100
and/or 30-days provision being the norm. No existing legislation provides for liability in terms
of civil fines. A number of acts simply prohibits final action or votes in closed session and imply
that any action taken in violation of the statute will be considered void. Some statutes go on to
provide expressly that the prohibited actions will be void, while other state that violation will not
nullify any action taken. Some authorize enforcement by civil action with relief usually patterned
after mandamus or injunction. Wickham, supra note 6, at 487.
"See Tacha, supra note 63, at 197.
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the taking of some final action by the company officials. It provides no
remedy for illegal meetings involving only discussion. Injunctions, since
they operate prospectively, provide a more satisfactory manner of enforce-
ment, and the threat of contempt proceedings is likely to be sufficient deter-
rent for future violations. However, a problem with the injunction in some
states has been a requirement that at the point at which the injunction
is issued there must be a showing of prior illegal conduct. Moreover, in-
junctions against a meeting are only effective when there is advance
knowledge that an illegal meeting is about to be held. Without such a leak,
the only prospective remedy is to seek an injunction to prevent the carry-
ing out of any decisions made or to seek invalidation of the decisions.
Nothing can be done about what was discussed. 8
Courts in many states have been reluctant to invalidate final acts of govern-
mental bodies. The recent Ohio Supreme Court case of City of Moraine v. Board
of County Commissioners of Montgomery County99 serves to illustrate this
point. In that case the Cresses, appellees, owned real estate in Montgomery
County which they leased to North Sanitary Landfill, Inc., also appellees, a
corporation engaged in developing and operating landfills. The jurisdiction of
the City of Moraine extended to the real estate. The appellees filed an applica-
tion with the Montgomery County Rural Zoning Commission to change a zoning
resolution of approximately eighty-one acres from a family residential district
to a heavy industrial district. The zoning commission referred the application
to the Montgomery County Planning Commission for review. After a public
hearing the planning commission unanimously recommended approval of the
change by the zoning commission. The recommendation was returned to the
zoning commission for a public hearing and review; the zoning commission
recommended denial of the application for the zoning change, and forwarded
its recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners of Montgomery
County. In May, 1978 the county commissioners held a public hearing on the
application and the city of Moraine noted its exceptions. The zoning change
was unanimously denied by the county commissioners.
The landfill company appealed the commissioners' decision to the Court
of Common Pleas of Montgomery County pursuant to Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 2506.01 and prior to the trial asked the commissioners to reconsider their
decision. The commissioners agreed, on the condition the court action be dismiss-
ed. A public hearing concerning the reconsideration of the zoning application
was scheduled for the November 2, 1978, regular session of the commissioners,
but the reconsideration was deferred until the November 9, 1978, meeting. The
reconsideration was deferred at the time it was to be discussed. Prior to finally
reconsidering their past decision the commissioners went into an executive ses-
sion for the purpose of discussing "personnel matters." At the readjournment
"Note, supra note 3, at 324.
"67 Ohio St.2d 139, 423 N.E.2d 184 (1981).
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of the public session, the zoning application was discussed and the Board com-
pletely reversed its prior decision.
The City of Moraine, as well as neighboring property owners, filed an
appeal of the commissioners' decision with the Common Pleas Court. It upheld
the approval as did the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County. Appellants
appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court on two grounds: the zoning issue and
an alleged Sunshine Law violation. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the
lower courts that the Sunshine Law was not violated. It granted, with approval,
the trial court's finding that
... the executive session was not a prearranged meeting outside of the
public hearing wherein considered decision making concerning the land-
fill rezoning took place. Moreover the intent of the Sunshine Law, that
deliberations concerning public issues be made in public, could not be fur-
ther served by invalidating a decision insofar as such deliberations were
laid before the public eye. 100
The Court of Appeals similarly concluded: "[tihere is no evidence however that
the Board of Commissioners arrived at its decision on the rezoning amend-
ment through the non-public deliberations in executive session.'" 1
The problem appears to be that there was no proof that personnel matters
were not discussed, or, to put it another way, that the zoning was. The execu-
tive session was permissible under the statute and no one but the Board was
present. The question arises as to the difficulty of proving a violation of Ohio
Revised Code section 121.22(H) which would invalidate any "formal action
of any kind" if such formal action was not adopted in an open meeting or
resulting from deliberations in a meeting that was not open to the public. Since
it is unlikely that anyone but those present at an executive session would know
what was discussed, a finding of a violation is highly unlikely.
Invalidation often does nothing more than to force a re-run public vote,
especially where the secret vote was unanimous. Additionally, invalidation can
cause tremendous problems for governments when money is at stake, bonds
issued, or contracts signed. The remedy might in some circumstances be far
worse than the disease. 10 2
Finally, a situation which presents a far more insolvable dilemma than
the prevention of Sunshine Law abuses in executive session is the proliferation
'°067 Ohio St.2 at 145, 423 N.E.2d at 188. See State ex rel. Walsh v. Board of County Commissioners,
No. 75-M-697 (C. P. Geauga Cty. 1976).
"'Id. But see State ex rel. Printing Co. v. Hughey, 2 OBR 449 (Common Pleas, Mahoning County, 1982),
where the court granted an injunction against the Youngstown City Council's practice of holding prearranged
discussions of city business without giving sufficient notice to the public. In that case, however, the court
found clear evidence that the city council had violated the Act. Still, it is not certain how much an after
the fact action like an injunction can have in a situation where the public officials may have already publicly
acted on the affairs which they have privately discussed.
" See Note, supra note 3, at 324-25.
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of the so-called "teleconference." Public bodies are making increasing use of
the so-called teleconference to meet quorum requirements and conduct business,
long a private business practice.
No open meeting statute addresses the use of the teleconference call. The
use of the teleconference call raises the obvious questions of monitoring and
notice, as well as the more problematic one of authorization of specific in-
dividuals to take "action" over the phone wires. One public official has stated:
There is no precedent, no case law, to answer those questions. This
is a developing area of the law. As long as the meeting is open to the public
and the public can participate in the teleconference call, then there's no
violation. The real question I have is whether business should be trans-
acted at these meetings. There is a fundamental problem: If you have a
person on the phone, you have a gnawing question in the back of your
head, 'Is that really the person authorized to vote?' These are questions
that should be addressed." °3
The impact of the use of the teleconference in the conducting of public
business cannot be assessed at this time. Suffice it to say, however, that its use
and growth is inevitable.
VIII. CHARTER MUNICIPALITIES AND THE SUNSHINE LAW
The holdings of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Petit v. Wagner"4 and
Leavers v. Canton"' both indicate that the Sunshine Law is not a matter of
local self government and will thus be upheld at least as to non-charter villages
and cities.'"" The real question therefore is if a charter city or village adopts
a charter provision which contradicts the Sunshine Law, which enactment will
prevail? Leavers seems to indicate that the conduct of a charter municipality's
meetings is deemed to be a "power of local self-government" then the charter
provision must be upheld over the statute.0 7 On the other hand, the courts
may decide to invoke the doctrine of "state-wide coneer concern" so as to insure
the supremacy of the Sunshine Law over any local meeting provision adopted
by a charter municipality.
Beacon Journal v. Akron' involved a charter city, Akron, which had
'
3Teleconferencing: Open Meeting Issues Raised, 68 A.B.A.J. 401 (April 1982).
101170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
1011 Ohio St. 2d 33, 303 N.E.2d 354 (1964).
"Leavers summarized the home rule power of local self government as follows:
1. An ordinance passed by a charter city which is not a police regulation and deals with local self-
government can be at variance with a statute on the same subject;
2. A non-charter city has the same power so long as its ordinances are not at variance with state
law; and
3. A non-charter city cannot enact an ordinance relating to local self-government that is at variance
with statutory law on the same subject.
Id. at 37.
1
7 See supra note 102.
"'See supra note 82.
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passed an open meeting ordinance. Since, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio
did not find the ordinance, Section 133.01 of the Akron City Code,"0 9 to be
in conflict with the Sunshine Law it never reached the question of what provi-
sion would prevail if there was a conflict. This case was, however, decided before
the 1975 amendments to the Act. The issue of a conflict between the Act and
a local charter municipalities' ordinance must, therefore, await future action
by the Supreme Court.
IX. CONCLUSION
The first article analyzing the impact of the Sunshine Law concluded that
ambiguities seriously flawed the statute, requiring revision by the General
Assembly."' A later article echoed this criticism, though somewhat more
optimistically. "I Much of the criticisms contained in those articles, printed almost
twenty years ago, still holds true today.
No definitive study has been made on the effectiveness of the Sunshine
Act nor have there been sufficient cases decided relating to the Sunshine Act
which would indicate the courts' views of the Act's particular strengths and
weaknesses. There is no empirical evidence that the Sunshine Act is being skirted
by either charter or noncharter municipalities; perhaps it is simply too early
to tell.
At any rate, the Sunshine Law represents a step toward more open and
responsive government. Some problems of the Sunshine Law could be alleviated
if the "similar decision making body" language of Ohio Revised Code section
121.22(B) (1) was clarified. In addition, the sanctions for violation of the Sun-
shine Law are virtually nonexistent; they should be strengthened. The real value
of the Sunshine Law is its stated attitude of openness. This attitude, more than
anything else, should insure that its benefits will outweigh any problems that
might arise.
" Id. at 192.
" Recchie & Chernoski, supra note 2, at 517.
'Note, supra note 2, at 1219-20.
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